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Abstract 
This paper surveys deep learning algorithms, IoT cyber security and risk models, and established 
mathematical formulas to identify the best approach for developing a dynamic and self-adapting 
system for predictive cyber risk analytics supported with Artificial Intelligence and Machine 
Learning and real-time intelligence in edge computing. The paper presents a new mathematical 
approach for integrating concepts for cognition engine design, edge computing and Artificial 
Intelligence and Machine Learning to automate anomaly detection. This engine instigates a step 
change by applying Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning embedded at the edge of IoT 
networks, to deliver safe and functional real-time intelligence for predictive cyber risk analytics. 
This will enhance capacities for risk analytics and assists in the creation of a comprehensive and 
systematic understanding of the opportunities and threats that arise when edge computing nodes are 
deployed, and when Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning technologies are migrated to the 
periphery of the internet and into local IoT networks. 
Keywords: deep learning algorithms; IoT; cybersecurity; artificial intelligence; machine learning; 
real-time intelligence; edge computing.  
Introduction 
Recent studies on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AI/ML) perspectives on mobile 
edge computing [1] lack detail, but provide guidance on how data can be processed [2]–[9] in real-
time, reducing edge-cloud delay [10] and inform on the topic of cognitive cyber security at the 
edge. This paper is focused on the topic of predicting cyber risk loss magnitude through 
dynamic analytics of cyber-attack threat event frequencies. Challenges that need to be addressed are 
mainly socio-technical, relating strongly to technology, regulation, economics, interventions, and 
directly relates to industries and their supply chains and control systems. For example, investigating 
the perceptions of risk and trustworthiness that emerge as a result of machine agency, which 
interact with regulation, standards and policy on the one hand and design and engineering on the 
other, spanning the physical and behavioural sciences. But the specific focus of this paper is on 
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integrating AI/ML in the data collection and analytics of risk through fog computing (i.e. use of 
edge devices) for forward-facing predictive outputs. We investigate a scenario where an 
organisation has implemented all the security recommendations (e.g. NIST), but the risk remains 
from uncertain and unpredictive attack vectors at the edge of the network.  
For narrowing the topic to assessment of these new types of cyber security, the research adopts a 
red teaming methodology for detecting and reducing threats and simplify compliance with internal, 
industry and government regulations. A red teaming approach is firstly applied by challenging 
plans, policies, systems and assumptions and adopting an adversarial approach to IoT cyber risks. 
With this approach, IoT cyber risks can be divided in three levels, edge, fog and cloud. The fog 
computing is placed in the distribution network layer and provides sufficient computational 
resources, low latency and compute-intensive applications. The cloud computing level represent a 
shared pool of rapidly provisioned computing resources, for high computation and data storage. 
Hence, IoT cybersecurity deployment in the fog and cloud computing levels is not a big concern. 
The small computation capability at the edge devices makes IoT cyber risk more likely to occur at 
the edge computing level. Hence, this article is primarily focused on the edge computing level.  
A red teaming approach is then applied to identify IoT systems that are mostly affected by a few 
types of network risk event. Those include: Eavesdropping Attacks, Denial of Service (DoS) and 
Distributed DoS (DDoS), Spoofing Attacks, and Man-in-the-Middle attacks (MITM). To describe 
briefly the relationship between these types of attacks, Eavesdropping Attacks is used for listening 
IoT communications without the transmission appearing abnormal, hence making it difficult to 
detect. After Eavesdropping Attacks has gained authorisation access, Spoofing Attacks are used to 
send spoofed traffic with a legitimate access to IoT network. The MITM is just an advanced 
Spoofing Attack where adversary is positioned between two IoT devices and independently 
intercepts data and communicates between endpoints, collecting sensitive information, dropping 
packets, and causing different security vulnerabilities. The DoS and DDoS floods the IoT devices 
network with traffic, this overloads the communication and exhausts the network, leading to IoT 
devices being unable to communicate. As simple as it is, this is the most common and most 
dangerous IoT attack. The small computation capability at the edge devices, make DDoS attacks 
really difficult to resolve. While new cyber security is constantly been developed (e.g. ISO 3000), 
the level of cyber-attack sophistication is also increasing [11] (e.g. the Mirai variants ‘VPN filter’ is 
delivered in multiple stages with modularised payload; ‘TORii’ uses its own encryption and evasion 
tactic). Considering these continuous changes, to assess the effectiveness of cybersecurity, we need 
cyber analytic approaches that can handle real time intelligence in the form of probabilistic data 
collected at the edge. But the effectiveness of cybersecurity should not only be measured by the 
protection of cyberspace, but also with the protection of assets that can be reached via cyberspace 
[12].  
In brief, we investigate the role of AI/ML in cyber risk analytics with use of confidence intervals 
and time bound ranges at the edge. The objective of such an approach would be to protect data 
integrity, while securing predictive analytic outputs and integrating such solutions in these new 
types of edge computing cyber security. In edge computing, the IoT-augmented physical reality is 
open to adversarial behaviours that are yet uncharted and poorly understood, especially the socio-
technical dimensions. This paper evaluates the impact of compromise in terms of its safety 
implications and resulting consequences on end system provision. 
Research methodology  
Quantitative risk impact estimation is needed for estimating cyber security and cyber risk [13], [14] 
at the edge [15]. Our argument is that without a dynamic real-time probabilistic risk data and cyber 
risk analytics enhanced with AI/ML, these estimations can be outdated and imprecise. Additionally, 
the use of red-teaming is a way of explicitly addressing attack as well as defence. We are concerned 
not just with securing a system, but to acknowledge that failure and compromise will occur and 
address how the system responds in these circumstances. This is an important methodological 
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principle which distinguishes out work within the cybersecurity domain. Recent literature confirms 
diverse cyber risks from IoT systems [16], including risks in IoT ecosystems [17] and IoT 
environments [18], such as risk from smart homes [19], [20], the Industrial IoT [21], and challenges 
in security metrics [22]. Cybersecurity solutions for specific IoT risks are also emerging at a fast 
rate, such as new models on opportunities and motivations for reducing cyber risk [23], adaptive 
intrusion detection [24], security economic by design [25], highlighting the privacy requirements 
[26] and strategies for achieving privacy [27]. But the usage of traditional risk assessments in new 
IoT technologies is strongly criticised [28]–[30]. Therefore, our methodology is based on 
mathematical principles and quantitative data. In recent publications on this topic [31]–[33], we 
discovered that the lack of probabilistic data leads to qualitative cyber risk assessment approaches, 
where the outcome represents a speculative assumption. Emerging quantitative models are 
effectively designed with ranges and confidence intervals based on expert opinions and not 
probabilistic data [34]. 
Survey of AI/ML algorithms  
The AI/ML are essential for advancing beyond the limitations of Value-at-Risk (VaR) models [35], 
where Bayesian and frequentist methods are applied with and beyond VaR models [36]. This 
requires federated learning and blockchain based decentralised AI architecture where AI processing 
shifts from the cloud to the edge and the AI workflow is moved and data restricted to the device 
[37].  Current gaps in cyber risk analytics are in the areas of descriptive, predictive, and prescriptive 
analytics [38]. Hence, a survey of AI/ML applications is presented in Table 1, to address the main 
questions emerging from this study on edge computing and descriptive, predictive, and prescriptive 
risk analytics.  
AI/ML Technique:  Application: References:  
Deep learning - ANN Network architecture [39]–[42] 
Anomaly detection, 
unsupervised learning, 
classification.  
Network planning / load 
balancing 
[43], [44] 
Regression [45] 
Classification – Bayesian 
networks 
Fault and failure detection / 
management 
[46], [47] 
Classification/Clustering - 
Autoencoders 
[48] 
Algorithms: supervised, 
unsupervised and 
reinforcement learning 
Network Management and 
Operations 
[49], [50] 
ANN (RNN) and random 
forest 
[51] 
Regression - ANN [52] 
Classification - Naive Bayes 
(NB) 
[53], [54] 
Classification algorithms: K 
nearest neighbours, SVM 
[55]–[57] 
GDNN [58], [59] 
ANN [60] 
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Dynamic game - Nash Folk 
Theorem 
Network Security and Breach 
Detection 
[61] 
Game theory and NB classifier [62], [63] 
Deep learning algorithms [64], [65] 
Algorithms: supervised, 
unsupervised and 
reinforcement learning 
[66] 
Table 1: AI/ML algorithm application for descriptive, predictive, and prescriptive risk analytics in edge computing 
Table 1 confirms that by integrating AI/ML in the risk analytics, we can devise a new approach for 
cognitive data analytics, creating a stronger resilience of systems through cognition in their 
physical, digital and social dimensions. This approach resolves around understanding how and 
when compromises happen, to enable systems to adapt and continue to operate safely and securely 
when they have been compromised. Cognition through AI/ML and how cognitive real time 
intelligence would enable systems to recover and become more robust is evaluated in more detail 
below. The survey in Table 1 is informed by but avoids overlapping with a series of working papers 
and project reports on IoT cyber risk [67]–[82], IoT risk assessment [83]–[86] and IoT at the edge 
[87], [88] found in pre-prints online. This research is specifically focused on AI/ML in IoT risk 
analytics [15], and it benefits from this established research knowledge. But with a focus on the 
topic of securing the edge through AI/ML real time analytics to build stronger transformative and 
impactful understanding on the topic.  
Majority of the current Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are based on ML algorithms and the 
CNN (Convolutional Neural Network) + LSTM (Long Short Term Memory) appear to perform 
better than other Deep Learning (subsets of ML) models [39]. Such arguments are difficult to 
generalise when tested with a single dataset. Deep Neural Network (DNN) has been applied with 
distributed deep learning to collect network-based and host-based intrusion detection systems 
(NBID and HBID) [40]. This is a very comprehensive study, where a multilayer perceptron (MLP) 
model is adopted. However, in a related research, the MLP (type of artificial neural network - 
ANN) was found to be the least accurate deep learning model [39].    
Network Based Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) that use statistical measures or computer 
thresholds have been related to security research since the early days of computer architecture [40]. 
But are ineffective for current cyber risk analytics of connected and highly complex ICT systems, 
because they present high rates of false negatives (failure to detect) and false positives (false alerts). 
Distributed attack detection at fog level was proven to be more scalable than centralised cloud for 
IoT [41]. If the attack vectors are known, then up to 99.999% accuracy can be reached by type of 
attack with bidirectional long short-term memory (LSTM) units introduced to recurrent neural 
network (RNN) [42]. Similarly, a Siamese Network Classification Framework (SNCF) can alleviate 
imbalance in risk prediction and present more reliable results when compared with other algorithms 
[60]. With SNCF two different types of risk data sets can be used, (1) public data set (less features 
and more samples), (2) real data set (more features and less samples). The first set could verify 
solving the imbalance problem, and the second could eliminate reliance on the characteristics of 
feature engineering. Such experimental SNCF results have shown good cyber risk prediction 
performance [60] and Software Defined Networking Technology (SDN) has been effective in 
detecting and monitoring network security when integrated with Machine Learning (ML) and deep 
learning (DL) to create SDN-based NIDS [46]. The main risk concern with SDN and Network 
Functions Virtualisation (NFV) is the centralised nature which creates a single point of failure [43]. 
To resolve this, three layered nodes (Edge-IDS, Fog-IDS, and Cloud-IDS) has been proposed for 
NIDS system in SDN-based cloud IoT networks [50]. Cloud environments enable IoT device 
virtualisation resulting with virtual IoT objects that can be accessed and controlled remotely though 
a dynamic virtual network [44].  
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A power load forecasting [45], can be based on the generalised regression neural network with 
decreasing step fruit fly optimisation algorithm. Similarly, logistic regression and multicriteria 
decision making in IoT fog computing can be used for resource allocation [47]. The main concern 
we have about the development of such algorithms is that deployment of 5G can separate real-time 
intelligence and security between IoT, IoE or even IoNT [48]. Hence, intelligence and cognition 
techniques would differ in application areas and architecture. One of the possible issues is that ML 
platforms (such as TensorFlow, Gaia, Petuum, Apache Spark, and GraphLab), are designed for 
offline data analytics and training data are collected, partitioned, and learned offline to construct 
machines for data analytics [49]. While some of the recently proposed detection systems for edge 
computing are operating in real time, e.g. LiReD [51]. Edge nodes can host and process the data to 
limit latency, and recently enhanced models can handle the earlier problems with missing values 
[52], while improving the detection accuracy [53] and decision making with early warning systems 
[54]. The classification accuracy can also be improved with edge filtering [55], position 
confidentiality [56] and dynamic data classification [57], to avoid system overload when tasks 
increase suddenly, by diverting and allocating complex tasks to devices with stronger computing 
power.  
Multi-Access Edge Computing based on reinforcement learning, enhances the performance of such 
‘offloading’ in polynomial time complexity - worst-case running time [58]. While integration of 
Deep Reinforcement Learning and Federated Learning with mobile edge systems, optimises mobile 
edge computing, caching, and communication, and makes edge systems more intelligent [59]. 
Optimising and balancing resource constrains in edge computing has been investigated with 
‘dynamic game’[61] and ‘game theory’ [62] strategies. Such optimisation is primarily theoretical, 
but highly relevant for red teaming of edge computing risks. Two models ‘Cournot’ and 
‘Stackelberg’ are proposed for making real-time optimisation of traffic flow [63]. These models 
need to be tested with real-time data to be verified, but the theoretical contribution is quite 
significant, e.g. applying the ‘Prisoners Dilemma’ on optimising decisions.    
Deep learning models recorded highest accuracy as 97.16% detection of DDoS attacks [39], and the 
multi-layered structure, makes them very adoptable to edge computing. Hence, deep learning has 
been applied for optimising performance while protecting user privacy in uploading data, [64]. But 
the computing and memory requirements, along with the high power consumption, make them 
difficult to use in edge computing [65]. Further research is needed to identify how deep learning can 
be applied in practice, with real-time data. Possibly reinforcement learning, 
supervised/unsupervised learning, and deep reinforcement learning [66], would provide some 
insights into how this can be achieved.  
Elements of artificial intelligence and machine learning in cognition engine design 
Cyber risk analytics at present is reactive and assessments are based on risk/loss events that already 
occurred. AI/ML in forward-looking predictive analytics enable threat intelligence prediction and 
faster attack detection. The main advantage of AI in risk analytics is the fast processing and analysis 
of big data where parsing, filtering and visualisation is done in near real time. Machine learning 
uses mathematical and statistical methods and algorithms that learn, build and improve models from 
data. This enables design of a cognition engine in the form of automated predictive cyber intelligent 
software agents that identify, assess and record cyber-attacks. After this, natural language 
processing (NLP) can be applied to perform behaviour analytics and create baseline profiles of 
normal behaviour and then monitor for abnormalities while continuously learning from the profile’s 
behaviour patterns. Facilitating a consistent and repeatable detection of threat indicators and 
predictions about new persistent risks that are undetected. AI/ML learn from multiple patterns (e.g. 
threat intelligence feed, device event logs, vulnerability information, contextual data) to determine 
predictive risk insights. Predictive risk analytics for advance notice of risk exposure and potential 
loss can be performed through monitoring the risk lifecycle activities, e.g. the reactive activities that 
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capture losses and near miss events. From reactive activities we can quantify the impact of losses 
and develop baseline indicators to compare mathematical results.      
Mathematical formulae  
To develop predictive risk analytic methodology for estimating the loss of cyber risk, we apply the 
aggregate loss method to compound a Poisson discrete probability distribution. The 𝐿𝔠 = aggregate 
loss distribution consisting of the compound sum of 𝑁 = frequency (intensity) and 𝑍𝔦 = severity 
(loss) distribution and is described as: 𝐿𝔠 = 	∑ 𝑍𝔦)*+, ,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒	𝐿𝔠 = 0, 𝑖𝑓	𝑁 = 0		 
Considering the (un)availability of probabilistic data, the 𝑁, 𝑍𝔦, and the consequent 𝑍𝑗 where (𝔦 ≠𝑗) are considered independent. This cumulative function defines a frequency distribution for 
aggregate loss as nonlinear summation. The function can be improved by considering the frequency 
distribution as Poisson variable, where for a given time interval [0,tc], the inter-arrival time = Si of 
two ‘risks’ within the interval follows an exponential distribution with parameter lc. This function 
can be described as:  
𝑃(𝑁(𝑡) = 𝑛) = exp	(−𝜆A𝑡A)(𝜆A𝑡A)𝑛!  𝑌* = 𝑆* − 𝑆*E,~𝐸𝑥𝑝(𝜆A), 𝐹(𝑌 < 𝑦) = 1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝{−𝜆A𝑦} 
The known issues with (un)availability of sufficient probabilistic data [31] can be mitigated by 
enhancing the precision of the sample size in the inter-arrival time, where the insufficient (few 
years) data can be considered as lognormal (Galton) distribution where 𝑡A  =365 (representing 365 
days). In a more specific dataset scenarios, the distribution will vary depending on the probabilistic 
data. We postulate that the 𝑡A  =365 has a fixed loss per day = b, where 𝑀Q  = total loss days for an 
IoT device 𝐼𝑜𝑇Q and the device is operational at time t and the total loss per  𝑡A  = b ×𝑀Q. 
Considering that IoT device can stop functioning (or be killed by grey-hat attack) at any point in 𝑡A, 
then 𝑀Q  represents a continuous random variable of the future (potential) loss from an IoT device 
infected for time x and 1(.), with a given discount rate = r calculated as v = (1 + r)-1, then 
considering the probability of IoT device stops (or be killed) and the discount factor, the present 
potential loss 𝑃Q can be determined as: 𝑃Q = 𝑣 × 1(WXY,) × (𝑏 × 𝑀Q)	 
This formula calculates the risk of loss depending on the IoT device surviving the entire 365 days, 
or stops (or be killed) during the 365 days. The second postulate is that the risk of loss is eliminated 
when the device is killed. The actuarial equivalent of this can be explained as the present values of 
the expected losses described as loading = 𝛿	and expected revenue (that was lost) = 𝜋] are equal to 
: 𝜋] = (1 + 𝛿) × 𝐸(𝑃Q) 
In time, when more extensive data from IoT devices becomes available, more precise 𝛿	can result 
with lowering the expected loss = ∝ and a more precise expected present value of the loss = 	𝐸`𝑃],a can be estimated as: 𝐸`𝑃],a =∝× 𝐸(𝑃Q),	and expected revenue (that was lost) as: 𝑃], =(1 + 	𝛿) × 𝐸`𝑃],a. The continuous random variable of the future (potential) loss  𝑀Q can be divided 
on the number of attacks (frequency) = 𝑁Q	and the and severity (loss) = 𝑍𝔦 per breach in a given 𝑡A 
can be denoted as 𝑅Q,*	and 𝑁Q would reflect a Poisson distribution with time-varying intensity 𝜃],and 𝑅],d and 𝑅],, = Υ],, + 1	where Υ],, follows time-varying intensity = 𝜆]. The 𝑀Q in a given 𝑡A for an IoT device 𝐼𝑜𝑇Q can be estimated as: 𝑀Q =	∑ 𝑅Q,*)f*+g . With a compound Poisson process, 
the probable present potential loss 𝑃Q 
with a given 𝑀Q in a given 𝑡A for an IoT device 𝐼𝑜𝑇Q, can be calculated with:  
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𝑃(𝑀Q = 𝑛) = ⎩⎪⎨
⎪⎧ 𝑒𝑥𝑝`−𝜃]	a, 𝑛 = 0l𝑗`𝜆]amEn`𝜃]	an𝑒𝑥𝑝 − `𝑗𝜆] + 𝜃]	a𝑗! (𝑛 − 𝑗)!mn+, 𝑛 ≥ 1 ,	 
The above equation is designed for IoT risk assessment, but it can easily be adopted for different 
types of cyber risks. For example, we could calculate IoT cyber risk from AI as 𝜅 for a given IoT 
device 𝐼𝑜𝑇Q	with 𝜅 × 𝜋],, where in the first instance, the total loss 𝐿q would include 𝑀Q and 𝐿𝔠. This 
can be expressed as: 𝐿q = 	∑ 𝑀Q +rn+, 𝐿𝔠 and evaluated with risk proxies from shortfall probability, 
Value at Risk and Conditional Tail Expectation. The shortfall probability can be calculated as: 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏`𝜅 × 𝜋], ≤ 𝐿qa, where expected shortfall is 𝐸(𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙) =𝐸 v𝑚𝑎𝑥`𝜅 × 𝜋], − 𝐿q,0ax. With r (described earlier), and the threshold = 𝜌, Value at Risk can be 
calculated as: 𝑉𝐴𝑅(𝜌) = inf𝐿q∗ |𝐹	(𝐿q∗ ) < 1 − 𝜌%, and the 𝐶𝑇𝐸(𝜌) = 𝐸`𝐿q|𝐿q ≥ 𝑉𝑎𝑅(𝜌)a. 
With the VaR and CTE risk proxies, we can calculate the risk margin ratio = 𝛿(𝐿) with the 
Solvency 2 Directive percentile method: 𝛿(𝐿) = 	 ()E()()  where 𝜌(𝐿) represents VaR and CTE 
risk measures, and 𝐸(𝐿) the best estimate. If this is considered with an assumption that losses 
would be larger than ransoms: ∝ of losses ≤ ∝ of ransoms. Then the power-law distribution can be 
calculated with the equation:  𝑃(𝑥) =∝ 𝑋E∝, where the variance analysis of ∝ parameter is 1 <	∝	< 2, with infinite mean and average even when 2 <	∝	< 3.  
Cognitive design 
Connecting the lost exposure of cyber risk from human-computer interaction (frequency), in 
different information knowledge management systems (magnitude), with artificial intelligence, can 
provide predictive feedback sensors for primary and secondary loss (vulnerabilities). These 
feedback sensors represent dynamic real time data mechanisms that assist and enable better 
understanding of the vulnerabilities - prior to cyber-attacks. The reliability of cyber risk analytics 
could increase significantly if decisionmakers have a dynamic and self-adopting AI enhanced 
feedback sensors to assess, predict, analyse and address the economic risks of cyber-attacks. 
The survey (in Table 1) identified all relevant AI algorithms, and the mathematical formulae (results 
in Table 2) articulates some of the possible solutions for the role of these algorithms in designing 
dynamic automated predictive feedback cognitive system, supported with real-time intelligence.  
Cyber risk analytic approaches with dynamic real-time and AI/ML self-adapting enhanced 
technologies that enable predictive risk analytics are identified in Table 1. While the design of a 
predictive cyber risk analytics is based on confidence intervals and time bound ranges in Table 2. In 
doing this work we are acutely aware that adding automation and further coupling to a distributed 
system also brings new opportunities for cascading effects and exposing new attack surfaces. These 
concerns are fundamental in the areas with increased automation of processes which have 
classically required human interaction. 
Dynamic and Self-Adapting Predictive Data Analytics with the Mathematical Formulae 
A range of data sources was used to apply data analytics with the new mathematical formulae. 
The Comprehensive Threat Intelligence was used to collect data from vulnerability reports and 
zero-day reports [89]. The Chronology of Data Breaches [90] was used to gather larger sample size 
from thousands of records collected over the last 10 years (2010-2020). The SonicWall cyber threat 
report was used to collect probabilistic data on trends of IoT attacks [91]. The aggregate cyber risk 
from a large sample population is not the ideal measure for calculating the cyber risk of a small 
and/or medium sized enterprise. Hence, we divided the large sample into subsamples that follow a 
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Poisson distribution with smaller total risk 𝜆A, where 𝜆A = 	 𝜆A, + ⋯+ 𝜆A and 𝜆A*, 𝑖 = 1,…𝑚 
represented as the individual risk of a subsample. Finally, the total cyber risk of the adjusted 
proportion parameter 𝑝 is equal to 𝜆A = 𝑝𝜆A. We estimate risk exposure of total IoT cyber risk 𝑝, 
and the IoT cyber risk from non-recorded devices as 𝑝 where  𝑝	= 	𝑝, 	× (𝑚	 × 𝑝E,); 	𝑚	 =	independent	sample	size. If we assume that	𝑚	 = 10,000 and 𝑝 = 0.00002. The 𝑝 = 0.00002 
derived from the findings that IoT devices are attacked within 5 minutes of being connected to the 
internet [11], while over 50% of the cyber risk professionals do not keep inventory of IoT devices 
installed [92], hence there are potentially over 50% more IoT devices exposed to attacks. This is 
calculated as 365 (days in a year) × 24 (hours per day) × 60 (minutes per hour) – 50% (the cyber-
attacks on not recorded IoT devices)1 where ten times 𝑝 = ‘high (amber)’ risk, twenty times 𝑝 = 
‘severe (red)’ risk. This reflects on findings that IoT will increase at a rate of 152,200 devices per 
minute by 2025 [93] × 525,600 (minutes in 365 days) = 80billion new IoT devices connected 
annually. This will increase the overall IoT cyber risk level. The twenty times assumption is based 
on the SonicWall report [91] stating that IoT malware attacks increased by 215.7% from 10.3m in 
2017 to 32.7m in 2018 and the trend continued in 20192. The twenty times assumption represents 
.99 in Table 1. The corresponding .95 and .90 derive from the .99 calculation. We can also 
realistically assume that ‘guarded (green)’ level of cyber maturity would lower the ∝ = .90, then we 
can calculate the shortfall probability, expected shortfall, VaR and CTE for different cyber risk 
levels and tail risk under different assumptions in Table 1.  
Risk calculation metrics Cyber risk  IoT cyber risk 
  Guarded 
(Green) 
Elevated 
(Yellow) 
High (Amber) Severe 
(Red) 𝐸`𝑃],a 9,225,798 8,302,872 8,323,645 8,495,883 8,826,248.5 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏`𝜅 × 𝜋], ≤ 𝐿qa 0.362% 0.390% 0.717% 2.952% 4.359% 𝐸 v𝑚𝑎𝑥`𝜅 × 𝜋], − 𝐿q,0ax 776 783 31,660 281,340 807,491 𝑉𝐴𝑅(. 90) 9,659,815 8,696,453.5 8,706,061 8,797,711.5 8,947,727 𝑉𝐴𝑅(. 95) 9,785,002.5 8,807,375.5 8,823,096.5 9,020,017.5 9,510,794.5 𝑉𝐴𝑅(. 99) 10,020,820.
5 
9,031,839.5 9,092,977.5 11,314,474.5 14,126,426.
5 𝐶𝑇𝐸(. 90) 9,823,671.5 8,844,958.5 9,021,798 10,482,011.5 13,461,685 𝐶𝑇𝐸(. 95) 9,930,712 8,942,115.5 9,283,971 12,076,385 17,770,438 𝐶𝑇𝐸(. 99) 10,139,834 9,137,848.5 10,729,379.5 22,130,721.5 45,991,022 
Table 2: Dynamic and self-adapting predictive cyber risk analytics based on different levels of cyber risk intelligence 𝐸`𝑃],a	= Expected present value of the loss; 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏`𝜅 × 𝜋], ≤ 𝐿qa = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙)	or	Shortfall	probability; 𝐸 v𝑚𝑎𝑥`𝜅 × 𝜋], − 𝐿q,0ax = 𝐸(𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙)	𝑜𝑟	𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙	𝑜𝑓	𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑	𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒	𝑜𝑓	𝑡ℎ𝑒	𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠;	   𝑉𝐴𝑅(𝜌) = Value at Risk; 𝐶𝑇𝐸(𝜌) = Conditional Tail Expectation 
Note: Assuming N = 1000, b = 1000, r = 0.03, ∝ = 0.9, 𝛿 = 0.1 in the IoT cyber risk calculation 
and number of repetitions = 100,000 
 
While existing cyber risk assessment models are based on individual risk calculation metrics, the 
approach presented in the mathematical formulae and demonstrated in Table 1, is based on multiple 
numerical risk metrics. The quantitative approach of the mathematical formulae, when integrated 
                                                        
1 365×24×60×.5= 262,800÷5=52,560÷262,800=0.2÷10,000 
2 SonicWall report [91] captured real-world data from more than one million sensors in over 215 countries 
with over 140,000 malware samples collected daily.  
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with Excel Macros, presents risk categorisations (Table 1) that are supported with real time 
intelligence. This presents a dynamic and self-adopting predictive cyber risk analytics approach, 
that is compliant with the existing NIST ‘traffic lights’ risk categorisations. The quantitative 
approach also correlates the NIST standards with the FAIR Institute efforts for quantitative cyber 
risk analytics. The mathematical formulae is similar to the FAIR-U approach [13], but instead of 
relying on a specific risk metric, its reliant on multiple numerical risk metrics. For comparison, the 
mathematical formulae uses different tail risk measurement and compares the impact of cyber risk 
under different risk categories. The ‘high (amber)’ and ‘severe (red)’ risk categories derive 
numerical representation of how rare and extreme events (black swan events) can increase the cyber 
risk impact. The impact of risk in VaR (.90) and CTE (.90) is not significant, but the risk margin 
ration increases significantly when compared to VaR (.99) and CTE (.99). This provides a 
quantitative perspective of impact from ‘black swan’ events, and enables more informative decision 
making on implementation of low cost and low security vs higher cost and higher security IoT 
systems, while putting ‘black swan’ events in IoT risk perspective. Worth noting that although IoT 
devices today are attacked within 5 minutes of being connected to the internet [11], computers 
connected to internet even back in 2007 were attacked on average every 39 seconds [94]. Given that 
computers even in 2007 had much more computing power than most IoT devices today, we can 
anticipate a continuous increase in attack frequency on IoT devices. Although such assumptions 
given the lack of data can only be described as super forecasting, the estimated average attack 
detection and mitigation in terms of the 5 min from connection to attack timeframe, can be 
described with different ML algorithms. Comparing the average attack detection and mitigation 
time in Figure 1. with multiple algorithms [50], including Distributed Edge-based Defence (DED), 
Centralised Fog-based Defence (CFD), Centralised Fog and Cloud-based Defence (CFCD) and 
SeArch architecture.  
 
Figure 1: The average attack detection and mitigation on IoT connected devices 
The average attack detection and mitigation time Figure 1, shows that although some of the NIDS 
described earlier, can detect IoT attacks within the 5 min average attack time from the moment of 
connection, none of the NIDS shown in Figure 1 can mitigate IoT attacks instantly. Therefore, 
understanding the risks before they occur is of a significant relevance to preventing severe impact 
from IoT attacks.  
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Discussion 
The novelty of the proposed research is in the relationship between AI/ML and securing the edge. 
With this study, we focused on delivering a higher Technology Readiness Level (TRL) by testing 
and verifying the formulae for risk analytics with industry actors in the field of AI/ML. The output 
of the research exhibits how an integration for dynamic real-time cyber risk analytics would work in 
industry settings. In addition, the research covers intersections between technology, regulation, 
economics, and interventions. This creates value across risk and engineering disciplines and 
resolves a contemporary problem that is relevant to the industry in general. Calculating the impact 
of cyber risk at the edge, with cyber risk analytics supported by AI/ML, contributes to cybersecurity 
of devices and networks at the edge. Therefore, the research relates to key government and industry 
priorities and end user needs.  
This research addresses the need for improving our capacity for a comprehensive and systematic 
understanding of the opportunities and threats that arise when AI/ML technologies are migrated to 
the periphery of the internet and into local IoT networks. The research methodology approach was 
developed upon past experiences in terms of the (un)availability of data.  Many similar models have 
been introduced and never used because reliable data could not be found. Furthermore, in terms of 
the (un)availability of data, lessons can be learned from previous research on data strategies [95]. 
The volume of data generated creates diverse challenges for developing data strategies in a variety 
of verticals (ex. AI/ML, ethics, business requirements). Simultaneously, designing a cyber security 
architecture for complex coupled systems, while understanding the economic impact, demands data 
strategy optimisation and decision making on collecting and assessment of probabilistic data when 
edge computing nodes are deployed, presents a socio-technical research problem.  
The research is also strongly related to personal perceptions of risk because of collecting 
probabilistic data at the edge interact with data regulations, standards and policies. These data 
perceptions, regulations and policies are strongly considered in our approach for integrating AI/ML 
in cyber risk data analytics at the edge. A cybersecurity architecture for impact assessment with 
AI/ML cyber risk analytics must meet public acceptability, security standards, and legal scrutiny. 
With consideration of the above, the research integrated areas such as economic impact modelling, 
policy and governance recommendations with computer science, to develop and design 
architectures for AI/ML in cyber risk data analytics. The research contributes to knowledge by 
integrating economic impact assessment with AI/ML and cyber risk analytics models that have not 
been previously integrated for securing the edge, and thus promote the field of developing a 
dynamic and self-adopting AI enhanced data analytics methodology to assess, predict, analyse and 
address the economic risks of cyber-attacks. 
Conclusion  
With the integration of AI/ML in risk analytics at the periphery, and with the integration of IoT 
systems, it is only a question of time when AI/ML will start collecting and analysing risk data from 
IoT systems. With the rapid expansion of IoT systems at the periphery, the accompanying cyber 
risk will inevitably increase and the reliance on existing cyber risk metrics cannot be taken for 
granted when different and novel threat level emerges. This research concludes that impact 
assessment approaches need to be reconsidered and redesigned to include dynamic and self-
adopting predictive cyber risk analytics. The conclusion builds upon the existing approach for 
categorising (pooling) risk, but presents a quantitative version of the NIST ‘traffic lights’ system (in 
Table 2), enhanced with multiple risk calculation metrics that calculate the shortfall probability, 
expected shortfall, VaR and CTE for different cyber risk levels and tail risk under different 
assumptions.  
This new approach also benefits cyber risk prevention, because cybersecurity solutions create 
different costs and cybersecurity prevention cost would differ depending on the cost, benefits and 
risk evaluation. The new mathematical formulae present a better understanding of the cost and risk 
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evaluation with multiple risk calculation metrics for different cyber risk levels and tail risk under 
different assumptions. The value of cyber risk real-time data from supply chains and control 
systems can be explained in economic terms, where the level of cybersecurity is based on the co-
ordination of sufficient protection of the communications networks. 
This study enhances the Technology Readiness Level by presenting a mathematical formula for the 
future cyber risk developments that are reshaping not only the business ecosystems, but also the 
data analytics of supply and control systems. However, the AI/ML infrastructure in the 
communications network and the relevant cyber security technology must evolve in an ethical 
manner that humans can understand, while maintaining maximum trust and privacy of the users. 
The mathematical formulae presented are built upon the existing efforts of the NIST ‘traffic lights’ 
system and the FAIR-U Tool, maintaining maximum trust and privacy of the users though ‘pooling’ 
of risk data into calculation metrics, while anonymising data from individual IoT devices.  
Secondly, the co-ordination of supply and control systems cyber protection though AI/ML must be 
reliable to prevent abuse from insider threats, organised crime, terror organisations or state-
sponsored aggressors, but also from the AI itself (e.g. AI pretending to be human). The 
mathematical formulae in this article relies on multiple risk calculation metrics, while existing 
cyber risk assessment approached are designed with individual risk calculation metrics. The 
integration of multiple risk metrics presents a more robust protection from abuse of individual data 
intelligence streams.    
Thirdly, AI/ML in cyber risk data analytics integrated in the supply and control systems needs to be 
designed so that it encourages the private sector to take steps to improve the management of 
confidential and proprietary information (i.e. customer or financial data), intellectual property and 
PII (Personally Identifiable Information). The dynamic and self-adapting predictive cyber risk 
analytics as presented in the article, is based on different levels of cyber risk intelligence that are 
‘pooled’ into numbers and not presented as individual risk events. Hence, it allows private sector to 
anonymise the risk data, and after applying the mathematical model, the data is presented into 
anonymous risk categories.  
AI/ML in cyber risk data analytics integrated in the supply chains and control systems would 
present innovative and cost-effective ways to protect such data. In addition, the AI/ML analysis of 
the threat event frequency, with a dynamic and self-adopting AI enhanced methodology, would 
empower the design of a cognition engine mechanisms for predicting the loss magnitude through 
the control, analysis, distribution and management of probabilistic data. The development of this 
cognitive engine and its application, would undoubtedly bring multiple benefits and would enable 
deeper understanding of the impact of cyber risk at the edge. Nonetheless, IoT networks represent 
complex coupled systems [96], that can be described as cyber-physical social machines [97] and 
social machines [98] should be observed in practice [99]. Given that IoT is considered as critical 
enabler [100] of value creation [101], the findings of this study would probably be best verified 
when observed in practice. 
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